Popper and His Method of Falsification
“But as for certain truth, no man has known it, nor will he know it; neither of the gods, nor yet of all the things of which I speak. And even if by chance he were to utter the perfect truth, he would himself not know it: For all is but a woven web of guesses.” - Xenophanes
WHY IS THERE SUCH A METHOD?
In the 1920’s, scientists have this notion that theories are scientific only if they are provable through observation and experimentation. True enough; theories can be valid only if they have taken series of tests and rigorous studies. Religious statements like “there are angels in heaven” or “God exists” are unscientific because they are not testable through observation and experimentation. What makes a statement scientific therefore is its openness to verification. Scientific statements must be verified through experience, i.e. they are proven through our five senses. In philosophy of science, we call this as the theory of Verification. A statement must be “empirically verifiable” in order for it to be meaningful and scientific.
Verificationism was then the criterion for judging whether a statement is scientific or unscientific. It was the answer to the important problem of Demarcation. This problem of demarcation sought to find the dividing line between what was scientific and what was non-scientific. It was the famous group known as the Vienna Circle – mostly composed of Logical Positivist – that proposed verification as the criterion of demarcation.
In the beginning of the 1930’s, Sir Karl Popper introduced his ingenious theory of Falsification. In this theory, he proposed another answer to the problem of demarcation. However, he did not simply propose this theory just for the sake of having another option for scientists to choose from. His theory was a clever solution to the various problems faced by philosophers of science. Basically, the theory of falsification or rational criticism sought to review the important problems that the theory of verification overlooked, solved the logical discrepancies found in the method (inductive) used by verificationism, and more importantly reoriented the scientists in their authoritarian attitude to the problem of knowledge.
SPLITTING THE PROBLEMS OF DEMARCATION AND MEANING
By means of the criterion of verification, one can tell whether a statement is scientific or not scientific. For the philosophers of the Vienna Circle, only a scientific statement can be meaningful. In this case, the theory of verification is not only the proposed solution for the problem of demarcation but also for the problem of meaning. Now, this poses a grave threat to all “non-scientific” or “non-verifiable” statements such as religious and theological statements, metaphysical and philosophical statements, and other purely speculative assertions. This principle renders them all meaningless! That “an all-powerful invisible Being called God exists” is of no meaning and significance to those who embrace this principle.
Karl Popper pointed out that a theory may be meaningful without being scientific. St. Thomas’ doctrine of the Imago Dei for instance may not be scientific but it is meaningful, even more meaningful than most scientific theories. Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas may not obviously be scientific but it is of exuberating significance. Thus for Popper, the problem of demarcation must be differentiated from the problem of meaning; the criterion of demarcation does not necessarily coincide to the criterion of meaningfulness.
Popper proposed falsifiability in place of verifiability as the criterion of demarcation. He altogether distinguished this criterion of demarcation from a criterion of meaningfulness. For him, falsifiability only applies to distinguishing which statements are scientific, and not which statements are meaningful. Thus, for Popper scientific statements are always falsifiable but not necessarily meaningful.
POPPER’S ANTI-AUTHORITARIAN ATTITUDE TO THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE
Rudolf Carnap, one of the leaders of the Vienna Circle, wrote in one of his later works that “assertions must be justified through observation.” For Popper this criterion is unsatisfactory. To say that our assertions are reliable because of our appeal to the authority of observations as the sources of knowledge presuppose an authoritarian attitude to the problem of knowledge.[1] Popper emphatically states that no amount of observation or source of knowledge can give certainty to our assertions. For one, there has never been any theory that presented itself as error-free. Pessimistically, he states “all sources leads to error” so that no theories can be certain. Scientific theories are just guess works and conjectures. He claims that there can be no such authorities and that a moment of certainty clings to all assertions.[2] Neither observation nor reason is an authority.[3]
Popper’s contemporaries believe that true knowledge is certain and that this knowledge can be achieved. They embrace the classical notion of true knowledge, i.e. that true knowledge is certain. Popper distinguishes true knowledge from a knowledge which is certain. For him, no knowledge is certain and perfectly reliable. No matter how well corroborated and applicable a theory may be, there will always be an error to it. Newton’s theory of gravitation is an attestation to this claim. It is the best-tested and best-corroborated scientific theory but it itself is contested by Einstein’s theory of gravitation. Inasmuch as there can be no amount of observation that can render an assertion certain, we can never be certain whether what we have asserted is true. As Popper states, “no theories are certain” so that, as a consequence, we cannot achieve certain knowledge.
However, science aims at truth. All theories proclaim themselves as a guess about the truth of reality, and we are not really certain about it. Quoting Popper himself, “we are only rarely successful in guessing the truth; and we can never be certain whether we have succeeded.”[4] It may be the case that our theories are already true but we cannot be certain about it.
UNDER THE GEIST OF SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY
Popper thinks in the light of Socratic philosophy. He believes that human knowledge is finite, which of course is almost self-evident. The human ability to reason, although it proves to be very beneficial, is by nature infinitely finite. This attitude towards human knowledge which the (Socratic) Greeks also embraced may have come from the experience of being overwhelmed by the vastness of the universe. Well man himself cannot fully know his own self. Thus what is certain is not certitude but man’s uncertainty. Socrates once told that wisest is he who knows that he does not know. Yes indeed, the one who knows that he does not know has the upper hand over the one who thinks to know what he truly does not know. Our recognition of our ignorance elevates us from the misleading sophistic all-knowing mentality. The more we know, the more we know of our ignorance.
So what does our ignorance benefit us? Like Socrates, Popper uses this knowledge of our ignorance to advance our knowledge of truth. This may sound ironic to the philosophers of the Vienna Circle but this harbors a very important place in Popper’s philosophy. Although there is no criterion of truth, there is a rational criterion for progress in the search for truth. And it is our knowledge of our ignorance, errors, and uncertainties that underlie this criterion. Here is what Popper says:
“Science is a critical activity. We examine our hypotheses critically. We criticize them so that we can find errors, in the hope of eliminating the errors and thus getting closer to the truth.”[5]
We are not certain about what we know but we are certain that there are errors in what we know. It is precisely these errors that we ought to remove and criticize in order to advance our search for the truth. If science is the search for truth, then it must be progressive. We progress by scraping little by little the errors (ignorance) of what we know, and from which we clear our eyes from what blurs truth.
So what does this now make of our knowledge? Knowledge is a combination of guess work (theories) and rational criticism. We start with guess works or conjectures. Although these are just guesses they are very important because we cannot start from nothing – from tabula rasa.[6] By modifying and correcting them we come closer to realizing the ideal of science, i.e. the attainment of truth. Popper uses the phrase “Rational Criticism” is naming this attitude towards knowledge. He boldly admits that it is a view he owes to the Greeks, in particular to Socrates. His rational criticism brought forth his method of falsification.
THE IDEA OF FALSIFIABILITY IN GENERAL
The scientific method proposed by Popper is a product of his epistemological view of knowledge. If we cannot by all means prove the certainty of our statements through observation, and if what is only certain is the presence of errors in them, then what we can only do is to prove the errors in our statements. In which case the statements must in themselves be structurally falsifiable. Obviously, we cannot criticize a statement which is not criticizable. It is in this area that Logic plays an important role.
As was stated earlier, falsification was Popper’s principle of demarcation. If a statement, hypothesis, or theory is not falsifiable then it is not scientific. Falsifiable statements must not however be mistaken with “false” statements. There is a big difference between the two; “false statements” need not be proven anymore because they are already proclaimed false, while “falsifiable statements” must be evaluated because they are by nature capable of being criticized using observational reports. If for Popper only falsifiable statements are scientific, then all scientific statements must be open to the possibility of being falsified.
For example[7], the statement “all men are mortal” is unfalsifiable because there can never be any positive data of an immortal man to falsify the statement. The statement “all men are immortal” is falsifiable because there can be a positive data of a mortal man to falsify the statement. Popper will identify, basing on their structure, the first statement as unscientific and the second scientific. Nevertheless, most unfalsifiable statements can be transposed to falsifiable statements. For all we know, many unfalsifiable statements are derived from falsifiable statements. The example above, All men are mortal, must have been inferred from the falsifiable statement “All men die before they reach the age of 150 years.” This proves to us that falsifiable statements does not exclude the unfalsifiable, it embraces and exceeds it. By restating unfalsifiable statements to its falsifiable form, we can proceed with rational criticism.
In a way, falsification still lives by the spirit of verification inasmuch as it shows that an assertion is scientific only if it is “open” to data of observation and experimentation. The possibility of being open to experience is after all the main property of all scientific statements. But what differentiates falsification from verification is a matter of logical procedure. Unlike verification which proves a theory by presenting data that support the said theory, falsification aims at disproving a theory by presenting data or experiments that invalidate the said theory. So if we say that an assertion is “falsifiable”, then it has the logical possibility of being falsified using data from observation or physical experiment.
LOGIC OF FALSIFICATION
There are two types of statements that are of value to scientists: the “observational statements” and the “universal statements.” Observational statements, which are also known in logic as “singular existential statements,” are assertions about the existence of some particular thing. “This is a white swan” is an example of this type of statement. In Logic, a singular existential statement such as the example is stated in the form: “There is an x that is a swan, and x is white.” Universal statements, on the other hand, are assertions that categorize all instances of something. In logic, they are stated in the following form: “For all x, if x is a swan, then x is white.”
By their nature, scientific theories and hypothesis are all universal statements about the way nature as a system works. If science seeks to find the pattern that weaves nature together, then it must see a cause that could have not only produced an isolated event in nature. Scientific theories, and especially what we call natural laws, must be stated in a way that encompasses the entirety of nature; or else they will not be called as such. From the inductivist point of view, universal statements can be inferred from observational statements. Deductive-wise, this manner of inference is invalid because it leaves an enormous gap of error. But inductivists, spearheaded by Francis Bacon, still claim that this is the method of science. Now how does one move from observations to laws? How can one validly infer a universal statement from any number of existential statements? Philosophers of science consider these questions as great problems that beset the inductivist method of reasoning. These questions were nonetheless answered by Popper’s method of falsification. Popper’s method claims that observational statements (single existential statements) cannot affirm a universal statement. Observations can never be a source of certainly true knowledge. That this is a white swan can never affirm that all swans are white. Nonetheless, observational statements (single existential statements) can be used to show that a universal statement is “false.” The singular existential observation of a black swan shows that the universal statement “all swans are white” is false.
The method of falsification can be stated symbolically in logic as the Modus Tollens.
U – O If U, then O
-O not O
-U Therefore, not U
The capital letter U stands for Universal statements, while the capital letter O stands for Observational statements or singular existential statements. The reasoning used in here is hypothetico-deductivism. It is hypothetical because it starts with hypothetical universal statements.[8] It is deductive because it arrives at a necessarily true conclusion. The basic flow of the argument is as follows: (1) start with a hypothesis or universal statement (U); (2) make a prediction of the hypothesis about a certain singular happening (U – O); (3) make an observational statement that contradicts the expected prediction (-O); (4) Falsify the hypothesis or universal statement (-U).
The Inductive method directly breaks this logical rule of Modus Tollens. It has the following form:
U – O If U, then O
O O
U Therefore, U.
In its first premise (U – O), the argument starts with a universal statement and its prediction (1 & 2). In the second premise (O), it states a singular existential observation which corroborates the first premise. And in the conclusion (U), we accept the universal statement. The grave mistake of the argument lies in the second premise and the conclusion. We cannot simply accept the Universal statement using only observational or singular existential statements. Affirming the prediction is not a warrant to affirm the theory that explains it. A singular existential statement is not equivalent to a universal statement.
(To be continued next meeting)
- Michael Jhon M. Tamayao, Ph.L., M.A.
ENDNOTES
[1] Karl Popper, “On the So-called Sources of Knowledge”, In Search of a Better World: Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years, trans. by Laura J. Bennett (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 45. This section of the book was originally a lecture given on July 1979 at the University of Salzburg when the author was awarded an honorary doctorate.
This book where this article and all other articles of Popper that I will use in this paper will henceforth be referred to as In Search in all the succeeding referrals to it.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., p. 50.
[4] Karl Popper, “On Knowledge and Ignorance”, In Search, p. 37.
[5] “On Knowledge and Ignorance”, p. 39.
[6] “On the So-called Sources of Knowledge”, p. 49.
[7] Examples are taken from Wikipedia free encyclopedia.
[8] All scientific theories are hypothetical inasmuch as they are all guesses.
Philo of Religion (Introduction)
Philosophy of Religion (Philo4)
Michael Jhon M. Tamayao, Ph.L., M.A. Lecture 1
Inasmuch as this is a “philosophical” study of religion, we are concerned, not with the particulars (different regional religious beliefs), but with the logos, essence, foundational qualities found on all religions. Thus, John Hick posited that philosophy of religion is a branch of philosophy, and not religion, that studies the prior phenomena of religious experience and the activities of worship and meditation on which religions or any belief systems rest and out of which they have arisen. And for the same reason, William James was also interested not in particular religious institutions, rituals, or, even for the most part, religious ideas, but in “the feelings, acts, and experiences wherein men apprehends themselves to stand in relation to the divine.”
And also for this reason we will venture on the concepts of The Sacred and Mystery, the general root of all religion. William James in “Varieties of Religious Experience” proposed his own philosophico-psychological account about religion. For him, Religious experience is the root of religion, as indicated by one of his chapters. Religious experience for him could further be classified under the “mystical psychological state of consciousness,” the root in turn of all religious experience and as such the inner possibility of religion. Before going into the specific psychological accounts of James regarding this state of consciousness, let us first discuss the more general concepts of the Sacred and the Mystery. After all, Mystical Experience has for its object – intangible that is – the Mysterious or the Sacred.
WHAT IS THE SACRED?
a. An Overview
For religion to be, it must be sacred. The sense of the sacred is the order of reality in which Religion is inscribed. In order words, the defining sense of religion, more than that of having a deity, is the sense of the sacred. This order or reality, however, is not to be found in the ordinary perceptible world precisely because it is “another” order of reality. Thus, it is hard to find a “determinate something” which lends itself to the identification with the Sacred. It could be “symbolized” but never “objectified.”
b. Is the sacred based on the subject or on the object?
The Sacred is found in the dialectical tension between subject and object. This means that the subject or the worshipper must be in a certain “attunement”, called the “religious attitude” or the “believing attitude,” which opens himself to the Sacred other. The Object, for its part, may be a natural entity, on institution, or a concrete act in which the sacred is recognized. The sacred then is neither subjective nor objective, but the result of the encounter between subject and object. Religion does not rise from object or from the subject alone but from their dialectic. (Ex. Marx, hardcore atheist)
c. Sacred vs. Profane
Simply put, the sacred is that which is cut-off from the profane. However, the irruption of the Transcendental sacred happens in the ordinary mundane events and objects of the world. Just as in James’ account, the sense of the sacred/mystical is usually awakened by nature, prayers, and exercises. But although the sacred or the sense of the mystical is awakened by the ordinary mundane objects and activities, it is precisely this that it transcends. Thus, the different objective religious manifestations of the modern day religions does not constitute the true and foundational component of a religion. What is more substantial is that sacred or religious dimension which dawned through them.
d. The Religious Experience
The root of religion is the religious experience. We will have to remind ourselves that experience is not synonymous with “mere fantasy” or “subjective arbitrariness.” As James specified, “our senses encounter certain states of facts.” Thus epistemologically, it is like any subject-object encounter in the world. However, it has a “noetic” character, meaning the knowledge of the experience could only be known directly. The knowledge acquired therein is non-transferable.
Moreover, just like any epistemological encounter, the experience is a situated subject’s encounter with reality. Thus, in any religious experience, there is a unique blend of the subject’s frame of reference as well as cognitive-affective disposition, on the one hand, and the object, on the other.
There is also, in the religious experience, the irruption of a Superior Reality or Being into man’s field of vision, a Reality or Being uncontrollable by man, and for this reason, awesome. We could connect this to James’ reference to the “ineffability” of the mystical or religious experience and the “passivity” happening in the subject. The subject who experienced the dawn of the Other cannot adequately “define” what has transpired (ineffable). Although we could express them in different theological propositions, symbolisms or icons, as is seen in the present day religions, these attempts are always incomplete inasmuch as there is always something beyond those words or objects which we can utmost only feel. And also because of the awesomeness of what has transpired to him, the subject tends to surrender his will to the superior power.
e. Mysterium tremendum et fascinans
This classic phrase underlies the existential tension that transpires in the subject. This also underlies the psychological tension of the mystic subject found in James’ article. Although the subject finds the Other which has dawned to him as tremendously overwhelming, he still opts to come closer to it. As the Totally Other dawns, the subject sees his essential finitude; that he is a powerless creature in face with the Supreme Reality. The subject is “insecure” of his finite, unclean, and sinful existence. We call this as man’s existential Angst. In contrast to fear, Angst has no particular object of dread. What one is “anxious about” is the very finitude of his existence and that which he is “anxious to” is the Other Reality/Mystery.
But on the other hand, the subject still finds the Holy/Sacred/Mystery admirable. The religious man is incapable of extricating himself from the Other’s pull. He is enchanted; he is enthralled. Precisely as Totally Other it draws the religious man while keeping him at bay. And for this the statement “Familiarity bridges contempt” applies. Something familiar is no longer mysterious and interesting, but something which does not totally reach out will remain unknown. Thus, the Mystery is always in a perfect balance of detachment and constant reaching out for without the one it cannot be what it is.
The sacred makes its presence felt in the ordinary and the everyday through the mediation of the profane. It manifests its sacrality only by touching the common-place, and yet setting a perimeter of sanctity around it. This tension involved in the manifestation of the Sacred in the profane reflects itself in the psychological ambivalence with which man deals with the Sacred: fascination coupled with dread.
f. Taboo and Sacrality
Incontrast to its negative non-technical connotation, taboo is a positive concept in the study of religion. A taboo is the recognition of the plenitude of power/holiness/Being that evokes in religious man the sense of the “dangerous.” This form of recognition is again rooted in man’s dread on the Holy Mystery. It is a recognition that affirms one’s radical fragility and the Other’s overpowering presence. At rock bottom, there is taboo only because there is something sacred.
g. The Religious Position is Courageous
Religion is always a surrender and response to the Unknown, to the Mysterious, and to the finitude of one’s existence. And it is this surrender that is the most difficult. The intellect always clamors for the unity of what it perceives and so attaches meaning to everything in order to comprehend it. But whenever unbridgeable gaps enter this necessary unity, man resorts to two things; the one cowardly and the other courageous. Imposing what you “want” to understand something is pathetic. It is like making your own ideal illusionary world. This is precisely a cowardly act because one is afraid to face the greater part of reality – the Mystery. One is said to be courageous if he overcomes this “dread” of his finitude. He accepts his finitude and thus highlights the infinity of reality.
“Man is indeed in his greatness when he falls on his knees, before God,” the ultimate expression of the Mystery. (From Blaise Pascal) For by doing this he lives by the Truth of reality. And what truth is that, it is truth that is predominantly untruth. Thus, to explain the Truth of Reality is to accept its Untruth and uncertainties.
It is the sense of mystery that highlights every religion; a mystery which is dreadful but at the same time beckoning. We want to escape from it, but it always charms us back into its grips. Thus the state of religion is always in the state of tension, a tension which is always seen as a paradox.
Religion does not give a rule for safety, but the high hope of adventure.(A.N. Whitehead) We could associate the sense of safety to the everyday comforts of public existence. The comfortable everyday existence exempt man from the adventure of authentic existence. It displaces him from his original state of solitude and responsible existence. True religion is not really a herd-phenomenon but that which brings man face to face with his original solitude, to his dreadful existence. We are not sure what life is to bring us because it is in itself a mystery, but we are responsible for being the captain of our lives – To be the sole agent responsible for controlling and surrendering it to the Mystery of Reality. This is why Whitehead stated “Religion is what man does in his solitude.”
h. If the religious dimension of reality is a Mystery, will it just occupy an insignificant part of the truth of the Reality?
The question presupposes that we each have our own idea of “truth”. What is truth? For the past two millennia, philosophers ventured on this critical problem and have arrived at different answers. Some proposed a correspondence conception of truth, others, like James, posited a pragmatic one, and still some attributes truth to the all perfect Being. For me the most enlightening account when it comes to religion is the existentialist conception of truth.
Truth for the existentialists is based on the Greek’s rendition of it as alethea (unconcealment). Truth is first and foremost a process, i.e. a process of unconcealment. Truth is an “occurrence” that is not bound by the staticness of propositional truth. This truth grounds all truth inasmuch as this is truth as “openness” to the possibility of the comportment of man and object. As a matter of fact, truth or the process of unconcealment is a mode of man’s existence. In the actualization of possibilities from nothing to something, truth transpires. In its broadest sense, truth is the dynamic happening found in reality; every day is a moment of truth.
But the truth of reality is predominantly untruth. The process of unconcealment presupposes the state of original concealment. Thus, the full essence of truth must also speak of its negativity; “the question of the essence of truth as unhiddenness is itself the question concerning hiddenness.” Inorder words, hiddenness is always and necessarily present at the occurrence of unhiddenness and helps the later come to itself. Truth is the primal strife that could establish itself as unconcealedness only through its original concealedness. “Truth is Untruth.”
Aletheia is not simply removing a cover but it is an unending process of uncovering the concealed. Reality or Life is an unending process of unconcealment. But that which we unconceal is overwhelming, beyond the finitude of our human existence. This portion of truth belittles us and asks us to surrender to its magnitude. No words can express it and no amount of human endeavor can exhaust its full significance. For this reason, this part of truth (untruth), which is the most dominant, is called “Mystery.” The Mystery is therefore the foundation of truth.
i. The Mystery
The recognition of the mystery is also the acknowledgement of its superiority, not by way of comparison, but precisely in the intuitive realization that it is beyond all comparison.
The Mystery is “totally other” and its total otherness is what is immediately apparent in its epiphany. It is not a perceptible “object” so that it cannot be categorized. Man, however, always wants to device ways for him to comprehend the Mysterious. He objectifies the sacred in an effort to render the Mystery more approachable and manageable. Although effective, this will not suffice. The Mystery will eternally remain the Totally Other. The Mystery does not simply yield to the way man has organized things, and to his neat patters and categories. But although they are “ineffable”, as James put it, they fill the horizon of man. Its overpowering presence is always full!
Traditional concepts of the Absolutely Transcendental Being/ God/ Divine is rooted in the experience of the intensity of the plenitude that excludes all composition. God is ultimately simple, as Medieval philosophers state. Brahman is SAT – CIT –ANANDA, Pure Being, Consciousness, and Bliss. The Divine / the Mysterious Mystery is pure and beyond expression. All the metaphysical sophistications of religions are means by which man refer to a non-perceptible, non-conceivable “presence” in religious experience.
j. The Sin that is Man
(Problem of original sin: can a baby, who is still unconscious of his actions, acquire sin? More so, the original sin?)
The Sacred inevitably highlights the imperfect nature of man – that he is and will always be detached from the Holy Mystery. Man is different from the Divine and the difference is highlighted by his finitude and the Other’s infinity. This original gap or innate separation of man and the Mystery is the basic sense of “sin” in philosophy of religion. Primordially, then, sin is not an evil action or infraction of norms but the existential state of man. Man is always guilty!
Although the Holy attracts him, man is always “kept off” because “he is not pure”, “he is not worthy” or “he is guilty.” The tension of attraction-repulsion is the primordial context in which the sense of guilt and sin should be understood. The original sin for example, as other universal myths of separation, is man’s very condition of separation from God. It is first and foremost a state (separation and exile) and not an action.
k. Hierophany
One way or the other, the Sacred, though Totally Other, must make its presence felt in intra-mundane reality, a presence that nevertheless leaves intact its otherness and irreducibility. This is exactly the concept of HIEROPHANY: the manifestation of the sacred in the profane. Religion is the ultimate product of this non-combining fusion. Although it makes its presence felt, it is never wholly transparent. It can only present itself through “symbols.”
How does the symbol work? Does it recollect the idea it represent like in any other mundane symbolisms? No. The symbol of the sacred works by way of PRESENTING (= making-present) the Sacred. It is the “there” of the sacred; the portal or the window to the Other. It is however not the Sacred itself. (ex. The burning bush is not God himself. The bread and wine is not the sacred itself. The Statues are not the Holy themselves, or even more the saints themselves.) Here are different hierophanic objects:
a. Nature and its different elements as mediations of the divine.
b. The sacred is present in the history of man.
c. Hierophaies of a personal type. Maniestation of the Divine “in persona.” Christ, Krishna, etc..
The Hierophanic objects have always been subject to human mutilations. Because man has the natural tendency to remove the vagueness of reality, he simplifies and controls the Mystery by controlling the hierophanic mediations. The return to the unadultered encounter with the mysterious has always been the cry of revolutionists.
l. Basic Propositions about religion
1. Religion is a cultural product of man. Yes it is a cultural product of man. But reducing religion to just this view is very antithetical.
2. There are various elements of various religions which are comparable.
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